










The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  contribute  to  the  analysis  of  Corporate  Social 
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  ( C S R )  f r o m  a n  e c o n o m i c  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  i n  t w o  w a y s .  F i r s t l y ,  
introducing a new definition and a new framework of analysis, which can account 
for  both  the  externally­driven a n d  t h e  internally­driven v i e w  o f  C S R .  S e c o n d l y ,  
developing a dynamic model of internally­driven CSR – which draws inspiration 
from  the  literature  on  renewable  resources  –  to  show  that,  under  certain 













































                                                 
1 The companies themselves are also increasingly aware of this relationship between CSR and profits. For example, the 2008 
Annual Report of ArcelorMittal (p. 27) states: “It is ArcelorMittal’s conviction that business growth, sustainable 
communities and the creation of shareholder value go hand-in-hand. Only by addressing the global issues affecting its 
business, its people and its communities, can ArcelorMittal help establish mutually beneficial stakeholder relationship, 
attract and retail top talent and maintain the license to operate […] achieve high impact Health and Safety improvements 
that protect the company’s greatest assets – our people: the Lost Time Injury Frequency Rate improved in 2008 to 2.3 
compared to 3.3. in 2007.”   2
In light of this, concepts such as ‘Business case for CSR’ and ‘Strategic CSR’ are now widely 










and  those  which  see  it  as  ‘internally­driven’.  According  to  the  externally­driven  view,  there  is  a 
demand for a more ethical behaviour by the firms among one or more of the stakeholders (e.g. 









                                                 
2 In the literature it is now more and more common to refer to CSR as only the ‘Strategic’ component of CSR, while the rest 
is called philanthropy or charity in general. For example, Antonio Gaspar (2003, p.3) defines CSR as “an investment from 
which companies should expect tangible returns and positive impact on their net profits”, while “philanthropy relates to 
donations or charitable giving from which companies do not necessarily expect any direct positive impacts on their business 
activities.” 
3 Another reason for focusing on ‘Strategic CSR’, rather than philanthropy in general, is that many empirical studies showed 
that the former is also more effective from a social welfare perspective. For example, a study by UNDP (2005) showed that 
only the projects which are sufficiently driven by business profitability can be considered sustainable in the long run, while 
charitable contributions depend too heavily on available cash-flows and therefore are often only had-hoc interventions. 
4 Prof. Jean Tirole, speaking at the third annual Economica-Coase lecture at the LSE on 19
th February 2009, on the subject 
“Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility”, classified as ‘Delegated Philanthropy’ all the CSR practices in which 































2005;  Becchetti,  Federico  and  Solferino,  2005;  Manasakis,  Mitrokostas  and  Petrakis,  2007; 









The  problem  of  asymmetric  of  information  arises  because  CSR  is  a  ‘credence  good’ 
(Manasakis, Mitrokostas and Petrakis, 2007), which means that consumers’ willingness to pay is 







their  promises  more  credible  (Besley  and  Gathak,  2007);  (ii)  a  market  for  socially  responsible 





                                                 
5 It might not be evident why the latter belongs to an externally-driven view of CSR. However one has to consider that the 
demand for government regulations – which the firms are trying to pre-empt – often comes from the Civil Society and other 
lobby groups, which are indirectly a stakeholder of the firm. This will be clarified in the next section of the paper. 
6 This theoretical problem has a great empirical relevance: in fact, it is quite common to hear news from companies claiming 






















d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t we e n  p r i v at e  a n d  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t s  v s .  c o s t s  o f  p ro d u c t i o n .  I n  f a c t ,  i n  p r e s e n c e  o f  a  
negative externality, the profit‐maximising production level of the firm’s goods or services is too 
                                                 
7 The socially-optimal level of CSR would be given by the standard Lindahl-Samuelson rule of marginal costs equal to the 
sum of marginal benefits. For completeness, in the model by Bagnoli and Watts (2003), there are some cases in which there 
is actually overprovision of the local public good. 
8 A ‘warm-glow’ component means that consumers receive not only the direct utility from the public good, but also an 
indirect utility from having contributed to it, which comes from altruistic preferences or social status considerations. Besley 
and Gathak (2006) showed that the presence of this component among some of the consumers, can mitigate the problem of 
free riding, but not solve it completely, unless it is strong enough to compensate for the free-riding of all the others. 
9  For example, Brekke and Nyborg (2001) show that ‘motivated’ workers provide less effort than what they would 
themselves consider morally best. In the authors’ words, a worker, despite “stretching towards his conception of morally 
















                                                 
10 One way to achieve this result is to assume, as Kelsey and Milne (2006) do, that the firm’s shareholders are also the 
people which are directly affected by the externality. In this case, the incentive for internalising them is straightforward, but 
it does not explain why firms would still behave like that in more realistic situations in which the shareholders are not 
directly affected by the externality. 
11 The economic incentive to do so is given by the fact that any voluntary reduction of the level of production (or reduction 
of the ‘public bad’ associated with the production), which is strictly less that what the tax-regime would lead the firm to do, 
leaves the firm better-off with respect to the situation with the tax. 
Figure 1. Traditional solutions to the problem of externalities  
Negative Externality  Positive Externality 
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These two cases are characteristic of externally driven views of CSR, hence our externality 
framework accounts well for these. Let’s consider now how it can be applied to internally­driven CSR. 



















which  would  grow  over  time  if  unexploited,  but  could  be  exhausted  if  excessively  harvested 





                                                 
12 One clarification is necessary here. What the firm pays for is always for the level of a tangible factors of production (e.g. 
materials, or number of employees), but when CSR can affect the quality of this factors, then the firm can obtain from it a 
marginal product which is higher than its actual marginal cost.   8
less  evident  ‐  case  of  quality,  this  is  due  to  the  way  reputation  spreads  over  time  and  to  the 





























A firm i employs a certain factor of production  y  to produce an output  z , which then sells at 
a constant price  p  (i.e. there is perfect competition in the market of the final output). For simplicity, 







available:  () , tt t yh E x = .13 














Following  Schaefer  (1957),  we  assume  the  simplest  functional  form  to  capture  how  an 
additional unit of the instrumental input  E  translates into additional units of inputs y, given by: 
                                                 
13 We maintain the notation typical of the literature on exhaustible resources, where E  is the level of the effort (to extract a 
certain resource) and h is the harvesting function.   10
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tt t ep k E x w E d t
ρ ∞ − ∏= − ∫  ( 3 )  
The profit function is linear in the control variable ‐ the level of the instrumental input – 





instrumental input, and this process will continue until  pkx w = . At this point the firm will have to 
s t o p  t o  e m p l o y  t h e  f a c t o r ,  b e c a u s e  o b t a i n i n g  o n e  a d d i t i o n a l  u n i t  would  yield  negative  profits 





=  ( 4 )  
w h i c h  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h a t  t h e  m a r g i nal  revenue  of  employing  one  additional  unit  of  the  factor  of 
p r o d u c t i o n  –  g i v e n  b y  t h e  ( c o n s t a n t )  p r i c e  p  of  the  final  good  multiplied  by  the  efficiency  of 
production parameter k ‐ has to be equal to the marginal cost of obtaining this additional unit ‐ given 
b y  t h e  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  o f  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t a l  i n p u t ,  d i v i d e d  b y  t h e  additional  units  of  the  factor  of 









                                                 
14 The firm’s time-discount rate is often assumed to be equal to the interest rate, because a firm can always reinvest their 
profits at the interest rate. However we will see later on in the paper how we can use it to capture the relative weight which 
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about  future  profits),  will  employ  the  factors  of  production  until  marginal costs  equal  marginal 
revenues, ‘as if’ it did not take into account the dynamic stock externalities.  
 
                                                 
15 In the literature on renewable resources, the most widely used function to define how a population grows over time is 
Logistic growth function, which has the following form:  () 1
x
x rx F x
K
⎛⎞ =− = ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
& , where K is referred to as the system’s 
carrying capacity, or saturation level (Clark, 1990). Despite not being used in our paper to avoid any loss of generality, the 
implications of using this particular functional form in terms of our model would be the same. The mathematical derivation 
is available upon request.   12
Proof. The Current Value Hamiltonian for this problem is: 














 ( 7 )  
where the first derivative of the factor of production’s growth function,  ( )
' F x , is referred to as the  
‘own/internal rate of return’ in the literature on renewable resources. 
The formula implies that a firm should increase the level of the instrumental input, up to the point at 
which  the  time­discount  rate  is  equal  to  the  factor  of  production’s  ‘own  rate  of  return’,  plus  an 
additional  element  which  captures  the  reduction  in  future  costs  for  obtaining  the  factor.  In  fact, 


















' Fx ρ > , and in this case the firm will not employ the factor of production at all, because it will 
make higher profits by letting the stock grow and use  it in the future.17 
                                                 
16 See the Appendix for complete mathematical derivation. 
17 Note that - for the non-negativity of the profits assumption - the second term on the left-hand side of equation (7) has to be 
positive, hence the whole left hand side of the equation will be greater than ρ . For this result to be realistic, however, we 
will need to make some assumptions on the fact that (i) if the firm does not utilises the factor, someone else will not do it, 
and also that (ii) if it does not employs it today, it will be able to do so in the future. These aspects are discussed in 
Preposition 4, in the last section of the paper.   13
For values of  x large enough, ρ  will be greater than the right­hand side of equation (7), since we 
know that, as  x increases,  ()

























































                                                 
18 In particular, the non-negativity of the profits has to hold. In fact, the derivative of this term with respect to x, is negative 
if 2pkx w > . Hence, the non-negativity of profit assumption is a sufficient condition to ensure that, as x decreases, the term 



















point – which we call  MAX S  ‐  in which an additional unit of CSR does not yield any additional benefit 
for the resource (McWilliams and Siegel, 2002).19 To reflect these elements, we shall assume that 
                                                 
19 It is important to note that these benefits are not private benefits for the firm, as for example in Baron (2001), but are 
benefits for the resource itself, in terms of increased availability and quality. Then, because in our model we have that the 
firms and the society as a whole put a value on the stock of these factors of production, both of them will benefit from the 
increased stock. Hence, we do not have the problem of distinguishing between private vs. social benefits, as it was for 
externally-driven views of CSR. 
Figure 2. ‘Enlightened’ firms and level of employment of the factors of production 
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Proposition  3: A n  enlightened  firm  undertakes  a  positive  level  of  CSR  –  defined  as  an 
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20 It is worth highlighting that this is just the actual cost of undertaking CSR, but does not imply that CSR ‘occurs at a cost 
for the firm’ - as it was for externally-driven views of CSR. In fact, we will see CSR actually decreases the marginal cost of 
producing the final good. 














⎡ ⎤ − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 in equation (11). Hence, for the equality to 
be verified,  ()
' , S F xS  will have to be higher, which implies that the equilibrium level of CSR will be 
lower. QED 
 
The  other  case  (i.e.  CSR  increases  the  overall  effectiveness  of t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  p r o c e s s )  
captures another common ‘business’ argument for CSR, which is that, for example, switching to 




  ( ) yk S E x =   (12) 
The optimal level of CSR in equilibrium is determined by the following expression: 
  ( )








                                                 
22 The fact that  ()
' kS  is very high at the beginning and then decreases with the level of CSR, while τ  is constant, ensures 

























o n e  f i r m  h a s  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  s a m e  f a c t o r  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  ( i . e .  t h e  case  of  a  ‘common  pool’).  In  the 
literature on renewable resources, this problem is known as the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Dasgupta 
                                                 
23 Interestingly, in the management literature CSR has been also defined as “Enlightened Self-interest” (Keim, 1978), or 
“Enlightened Value-Maximization” (Jensen, 2000) 
24 “When Mars and Cadbury talk about their cocoa supplies being sustainable, they mean it. Chocolate manufacturers are 
worried about how much cocoa will be available in a decade from now” (“Why Corporate Social Responsibility is a 
Survivor”, Financial Times, 12











factors  such  as  employees’  motivation,  goodwill,  ‘social  licence  t o  o p e r a t e ’ ,  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  












discount  rate  of  enlightened f i r m  i s  lo w e n o u g h  ‐  we  c a n  b e  o p t i m i s t i c  t h a t  t h e  P a r e t o ‐e f f icient 
                                                 
25 This is Pareto-inefficient also for the firms’ perspective, because for enlightened firms the choice to employ the factor up 
to the level at which marginal cost equal marginal benefits is NOT the profit-maximizing strategy. 
26 It should be noted that this exclusive access would have to be for an infinite time, or at least that the firms does know 
when it is the last period. Otherwise, if the firm expects the licence to expire at time t+n, it knows that it will not have access 
to the future benefits of being enlightened, thus at t+n-1 it will find optimal to employ the factor of production up to the 



























                                                 
27 In the case of joint projects, we could expect to share the costs in proportion to the expected benefits from each projects, 
and that the final level of CSR at equilibrium will be equal to the Lindahl-Samuelson rule of marginal cost equal to the sum 
of marginal benefits for all firms. However, in reality most of the times the costs of a project are allocated taking into 
consideration the specific skills of each firms, in order to minimize total costs by maximizing contributions in kind by each 
firm, and allocating each task to the most efficient firm (see Balboni, Charles-Soverall and Levy, 2007).   20
























Responsible’ are  better  able  to  attract  and  retain  the  and  most  productive  and  most  motivated 
employees (Brekke and Nyborg, 2005; Collier and Esteban, 2007). Similarly, the probability that the 
                                                 
28 If we combine the problem of future access to the ‘common pool’ one, then the condition to enforce collusion would be 
that all the firms, which currently have access to the factor of production, should have a positive probability of accessing the 
factor for every period in the future; or at least that all the firms should attach a non-zero probability to his, and all the other 
firms’ future access to the factor. Otherwise, collusion will not be sustainable and, by backward induction, firms will employ 
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  ( ) ( ) ,, x Fx S hx E =− &   (8) 
We have now two control variables, S and E. The Current­Value Hamiltonian for this problem is: 
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  (14) 